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Abstract
The Lincoln Adaptable Real Time Information Assurance Testbed (LARIAT) project is the first
fully automatable network testbed for the evaluation of information assurance (IA) technologies.
It allows researchers to easily set up experiments that evaluate the accuracy of host-based and
network-based intrusion detection systems (IDSs). Initially, the network traffic it could produce
used UNIX services and protocols as implemented for the Linux and Solaris platforms. However,
due to the widespread deployment of Windows-based systems in production environments, it is
necessary to include Windows-based traffic when testing IA systems in order to provide a
comprehensive evaluation.
This thesis describes WinNTGen, a Windows network traffic generation system that integrates
into the existing LARIAT framework and enables it to produce Windows-based network traffic.
To do this, WinNTGen simulates the actions of a user controlling applications that in turn use
network resources. This frees WinNTGen from the need to re-implement network protocols and
allows it to operate at a higher level of abstraction.
WinNTGen controls applications via loadable libraries that encapsulate the manner in which a
typical user interacts with a particular application. The statistical parameters that specify the
behavior of a user with each application are derived from real users' behavioral data as they
interacted with each application. The system is flexible and extensible so that different versions
of the same application as well as additional applications can be controlled by modifying and
adding libraries.
Finally, the reality and the throughput of the network traffic produced by the WinNTGen system
are evaluated.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert K. Cunningham
Tide: Assistant Group Leader, MIT Lincoln Laboratory
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1.1 Evaluating Network-Based Information Assurance Systems
Due to the rapid growth of technologies surrounding networked computing resources, it has
become necessary to create fully automated test systems for evaluating network-based
Information Assurance (IA) systems. In a general sense, IA is "knowledge management"[ 1].
Currently IA technologies are "most closely associated with detection of and response to
vulnerabilities and events relating to cyber attacks"[1] although the area of IA covers many other
technologies such as authentication and cryptology. More formally, IA technologies are
responsible for protecting data, detecting unauthorized manipulations of data, and responding
appropriately to any breaches of security.
There is a large need for comprehensive IA systems. Annual losses by corporations,
universities, and government agencies due to computer crimes is measured in billions of dollars
and many of the attacks go unnoticed or unreported[2]. These attacks can come from both inside
and outside of organizations.
One of the rapidly developing information assurance technologies that warrants focus is
the intrusion detection system (IDS). IDSs attempt to signal system misuse through examination
of network traces, audit logs from individual hosts, or both. Even though there are technologies
to limit abuse, such as firewalls, these systems are fallible since they have incomplete knowledge
and are static in nature. Because computer networks and the applications that communicate
across them are complex and rapidly changing, bugs, flaws, and weaknesses are constantly
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introduced that could allow a malicious user to gain access to private resources. It is therefore
necessary that these systems be deployed alongside a more sophisticated IDS capable of alerting
system administrators to possible abuses so that vulnerabilities can be eliminated.
In order to evaluate the accuracy of the technical approach of a particular IDS, it is
necessary to create a controlled network environment in which the IDS examines network traffic
and host logs produced in a predetermined manner. This way, specific aspects of the IDS may be
tested by comparing IDS alerts to ground truth. IDS evaluations have been conducted in this
manner by several groups. A summary of some of the more widely known evaluations can be
found in Network Intrusion Detection: An Analyst's Handbook[3 ].
The DARPA 1998[4] and 1999[5, 6] offline intrusion detection evaluations conducted at
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory provided assessments of various
IDSs by supplying the IDS researchers with network traces and host log data that had been
recorded from a network testbed. Researchers reported the alerts generated by their IDSs, and
these were scored using a list of when the attacks actually occurred. In the 1998 evaluation only
UNIX style background traffic and attacks were included. The 1999 evaluation included all the
traffic types found in the 1998 evaluation as well as a limited variety of network traffic produced
by Windows NT 4.0 that was mostly produced by more traditional protocols such as HTTP.
Attacks in both evaluations were executed by a human actor.
The Lincoln Adaptable Real-time Information Assurance Testbed (LARIAT) [7, 8] was
developed to address certain limitations and inconveniencies of the evaluations and its tool set by
automating the time consuming tasks of setting up the evaluation run and collecting run-time
statistics and data. By automating these tasks and allowing for multiple network configurations,
organizations using LARIAT are able to perform experiments tailored to their specific network
environment. LARIAT emphasizes automatically generating repeatable real time background
and attack traffic for evaluating IA systems. This also allows LARIAT to be used in the
evaluation of host-based IDSs, which requires real time network traffic. Initially LARIAT used
9
UNIX services and protocols as implemented for the Linux platform in order to produce the
network traffic. Attacks in LARIAT are completely automated and it is possible to chain together
multi-stage attacks. Recent work on the Thor system [9] built upon the automated attack ideas in
LARIAT and added the ability to vary individual attacks.
Given the facts that LARIAT was not initially capable of producing extensive network
traffic from Windows NT, and that and it is common for a network to include hosts running the
Windows NT OS, as can be seen from Section 2.4, it was necessary to create a system capable of
producing Windows NT traffic that could integrate with LARIAT.
1.2 The Development of a Windows Traffic Generator
This thesis describes the design and implementation of WinNTGen, a system that produces
realistic Windows NT network traffic and integrates into the existing LARIAT system. The
system generates traffic associated with Microsoft implementations of cross-platform services,
such as HTTP traffic, as well as Microsoft-specific traffic that results from communication
between Windows Workstations and Windows Servers, such as SMB over TCP/IP.
1.3 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 describes the previous work in the area of traffic generation and evaluation of
information assurance technologies, as well as the motivation for creating a Windows traffic
generation system. Chapter 3 covers the way in which Windows NT users are measured and
modeled and how these models are used to produce network traffic. Chapter 4 provides
implementation details of the WinNTGen system, several attempted and rejected designs, and a
description of how WinNTGen is integrated into LARIAT. Chapter 5 evaluates the performance
of the system in terms of traffic throughput and resemblance to actual traffic. Finally, Chapter 6





Given the potential of large financial losses [2] and other immeasurable damages caused by
compromised information as a result of a cyber attack, it is desirable for institutions to deploy IA
systems capable of protecting themselves from such threats. However, if the IA system itself is
flawed it only serves to provide a false sense of security which is certainly worse than having no
system at all. It is therefore necessary to evaluate such systems in order to determine their true
effectiveness. Network-based and host-based IA technologies, specifically IDSs, are evaluated
by providing them with network traffic, host log data, or both, and then examining the alerts
generated in order to determine if the IDS did indeed detect everything it should have.
There is a temptation for an institution interested in deploying an IDS to perform an
evaluation of several IDSs on their own network to determine which one performs best in their
particular network environment. However, this quickly becomes an expensive proposition since
time must be spent in installing and configuring each IDS in their network environment as well as
evaluating experiment results. A recent IDS evaluation performed by Network World took three
months, involved three full time staff, and cost tens of thousands of dollars[l 0]. For an institution
evaluating a small subset of IDSs for their own use, there is no guarantee that the IDSs that they
choose to evaluate perform the best in their type of network environment.
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A more viable, cost effective approach to the IDS evaluation problem is to use a network
testbed that is designed for rapid reconfiguration and testing of IDSs. Using a testbed approach
there are several possible ways in which an IDS can be evaluated.
The first possibility is that vendors can be provided with a testbed environment with
which they can evaluate their own IDSs before they are deployed. The advantage to this
approach is that it allows vendors to shorten their evaluation and improvement cycle as well as
perform thorough evaluations of their final product before it is released. However, this does have
the disadvantage that vendors could create experiments that make their IDS appear to perform
better than it actually does. In order to address concerns about inaccurate evaluations by vendors,
there is another possibility that a centralized IDS evaluation can be performed by an independent
group in which multiple IDSs are evaluated on several common network configurations.
Organizations could then take the two or three IDSs that performed the best in the network
configuration that most closely resembled their own and, if they choose, perform further
evaluations on this subset in order to select the best one of these to use.
Section 2.2 gives an overview of the 1998 and 1999 DARPA IDS evaluation which is the
original research that uses a variety of testbed generated network traffic as a part of IDS
evaluation. Section 2.3 describes LARIAT which grew out DARPA IDS evaluation and sought
to address some of the most important limitations of the previous system.
2.2 1998 & 1999 DARPA IDS Evaluation
The IDS evaluation conducted at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory
[6] is the first to provide a system to evaluate the technical accuracy of DARPA funded IDSs.
The research built upon previous approaches to evaluating IDSs [11-13], substantially increasing
the number of attacks and expanding the breadth of background traffic. Its purpose was to
provide rich data sets for testing and experimentation with various ID algorithms and
technologies, to evaluate ID approaches by analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of each, to
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facilitate analysis of how and why alternate approaches to IDSs differ, and to report to DARPA
information necessary to guide and focus future research directions [6].
The authors indicate that future evaluations should include more Windows NT traffic and
that the traffic should be scriptable. The first part of the statement is motivated by the fact that the
Windows OS is widely deployed, and should be included in a comprehensive IDS evaluation.
The second part of the statement was made because in the 1999 DARPA IDS Evaluation during
the traffic generation sessions, human actors would perform on the order of one to three manual
actions each day. These tasks included, but were not limited to, upgrading software, adding users,
and changing passwords. As a result, the recorded audit data could no be perfectly recreated.
Scripting these actions would add more accurate simulation repeatability and better ground truth.
Also relevant to this thesis is the fact that in the 1999 DARPA IDS Evaluation network
traffic produced by the Windows NT machines was limited in scope in that many of the Windows
NT-specific protocols were not used. Specifically, in that evaluation there were three different
types of Windows NT background traffic present. The first was from telnet connections to a
Windows NT host made by simulated users from RedHat Linux hosts. The second was from an
auto-browser module residing on the Windows NT host that simulated a user browsing to
different predefined web pages. The auto-browser was built using JavaScript and ran out of
Netscape browser and so did not produce or receive HTTP traffic characteristic of the native
Windows OS browser, Internet Explorer. The last type of traffic resulted from a human actor
performing various administrative tasks such as running statistics generating scripts and posting
the results in Excel spreadsheet form to a web site.
There were other types of Windows NT traffic, but this traffic resulted from attacks being
carried out against the Windows NT host and are not considered part of the general background
traffic.
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2.3 Lincoln Adaptable Realtime Information Assurance Testbed
LARIAT's two design goals are to create a system capable of real-time evaluations and to create
a deployable, configurable, easy-to-use testbed that could be easily integrated into an
organization's existing network. By integrating LARIAT into an existing network, IA
technologies, as well as any other network component, can be evaluated in a relevant network
configuration with relevant background traffic. It is also able to generate both single-component
attacks and multi-component attacks, and automate many of the time consuming tasks of past IDS
evaluations.
In order to achieve these goals, LARIAT is designed so that a user of the system can
interact with a central director, the experiment configuration and automation tool. The director
alleviates the need for the user to have detailed knowledge of the testbed itself. The director is
responsible for the actual configuration and subsequent running of an evaluation. A possible
LARIAT topology is depicted in Figure 1.
14




a e Under Evaluation Intemnal Web Server External Web Server
Figure 1: Example LARIAT Topology
Since WinNTGen is integrated into LARIAT, the following sections provide an
explanation of the roles of different components in a LARIAT setup and a summary of the
evaluation process. A more detailed description is available in the original LARIAT paper[7].
2.3.1. LARIAT Director
The LARIAT director controls almost all aspects of the testbed. A user of LARIAT needs only
interact with the director in order to run experiments once the testbed is set up. The director is
capable of producing network traffic profiles based on the parameters provided by experimenter.
These proffles dictate the production of network traffic by the traffic generating hosts. The
profiles currently in use in LARIAT were created from analyzing traffic from a United States Air
Force base. In order to simplify the setup of experiments, the LARIAT director has prefabricated
traffic profiles, user profiles, and attack configurations that can be modified and tailored to a
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particular experiment. It is not necessary to specify all aspects of an experiment every time it is
run.
2.3.2. Database
The database is responsible for storing a representation of the network, the experiment parameters,
the traffic and user profiles, run time logging, and experiment results. Using a database
centralizes the information, eases deployment and reconfiguration of the testbed, and standardizes
the structure of information.
2.3.3. Traffic Generators
A traffic generator may contain on the order of 2500 virtual IP addresses or may contain a few or
even just one. It may be responsible for background traffic such as web surfing and sending
emails or it may be involved solely in attacking another host or being attacked.
There is a common required functionality in the traffic generators, however. Each traffic
generator must be capable of communicating with the director and the database. From the
director it obtains the address of the database and directions of when to start, stop, reread
parameters from the database, and report run information to the database.
2.3.4. Evaluation Overview
An experiment in LARIAT is comprised of eight steps, as depicted in Figure 2. In the first step
the user selects and edits attack and background traffic profiles for the session. The remaining
seven steps are automated and controlled by the director. In these steps, the director initializes
the network, distributes the configuration to the traffic generators, verifies pre-conditions, runs
the traffic, verifies that the traffic ran as desired and collects results, and then cleans up in
preparation for a fresh run. The following is a detailed description of these steps.
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Select Profile
- select & edit traffic profile
- select attacks & strike time
Network Discovery
Verify accessibilty of hosts and services
InitIalize Network Clean Up
S- reset user accounts CenU
- remove old traffic - reinstate corrupted files
Distribute Configurations - clear logs -remove pre-conditions
- distribute profiles to hosts - clear process table - archive traffic scripts
- clear process table
Pre-conditions Verify / Score
- setup network conditions required 
- examine attack ogsfor the test (eg. Anonymous ftp) 
- verify attack success
- generate traffic & attack scripts 
- exanine IDS output (future)
- schedule attack + traffic scripts - score IDS (future)
- start loggers Run Traffic
-view progress in -real-time"
- attacks. IDS output
Figure 2: Experiment Flow
The experimenter first selects a profile on the director for the run. As mentioned before,
network traffic profiles consist of host, user, and attack configurations. The host configurations
contain host details such as services offered, accounts, etc. User configurations contain
information such as the type of user (secretary, administrator), frequency of ftp and telnet
sessions, and periods of activity. The attack configuration contains attack components organized
into scenarios that recreate the attacker actions as he performs all the steps required to penetrate a
network. Several representative attack scenarios are provided[8].
Following the specification of the profile by the user, the director distributes the
configuration information to a database and then indicates the start of an experiment to the traffic
generators via a simple custom network protocol. The traffic generators respond by fetching the
experiment parameters relevant to them from the database.
Once the traffic generators have obtained their configurations, they prepare themselves
for the experiment which typically involves initializing user models and scripts that will define
the behavior of the traffic generator for the duration of the experiment.
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Following the preparation, the evaluation commences. Each traffic generator produces
traffic according to the aforementioned scripts and models. The director does not need to be
active during this phase. Real time statistics on the run can be observed, but the experimenter
must be aware that the affects of this control traffic may interfere with the evaluation.
After the evaluation run or at certain points during the run, the director can query the logs
on the various machines and the database to determine the success or failure of any of the scripts
or items in a queue. For example, in an evaluation involving a multi-stage attack on a victim host,
the success or failure of each stage may be observed from the director.
2.4 The Need for Windows Traffic
Both the DARPA IDS evaluations and LARIAT systems had network traffic produced by
Windows NT computers, but lacked the capability to produce much of the traffic that is
characteristic of Windows NT. As the Department of Defense and many commercial companies
use more Widows-based products, IDS evaluation systems will need the capability to incorporate
realistic Windows network traffic into their experiments.
Statistics taken from browser traffic in spring 2002 [14-16] indicate that Microsoft holds
roughly 80 to 90 percent of the workstation OS market with Windows 2000 and XP making up
between 20 to 30 percent of the total. A March 2000 study of the web-server OS market [17]
indicates that Microsoft's Internet Information Server (IIS) comprises around 23 percent of all
web servers, and 30 to 40 percent of commercial web servers.
These numbers indicate that there is a significant presence of both workstations and
servers with some version of the Windows OS installed. The ability to produce both Windows
background and attack network traffic will enable evaluation systems to perform more
comprehensive assessments of IDSs.
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2.5 Available Windows Traffic Production Systems
Prior to the creation of the Windows traffic generator, a survey of commercially available traffic
production systems was performed to determine if they were suitable for use in an evaluation
network such as LARIAT. In order for a system to be usable in an IA technology evaluation, it
needs to be capable of producing a broad range of reasonably realistic network traffic whose mix
and rate can be configured. Several systems were reviewed that were capable of generating
Windows NT traffic in some capacity. These systems fell into three different categories.
The first category of tools is the stress testers [18-20]. These tools are used in the
evaluation of an individual host's ability to handle high throughput of a specific protocol. Neither
inter-packet timing nor packet contents matches what is commonly seen on real networks, so
these tools are not appropriate for general use in LARIAT.
The second category of tools is used for evaluating network configuration [21]. These
tools observe network traffic and provide statistics, graphs, and/or topologies of the network. The
network traffic generation ability of these tools is limited and is provided only for playing back
captured or generated packets in order to verify the functionality of network resources.
Finally, the third category includes tool with the combined functionality of the above
tools [22].
Since all of these systems did not meet the requirements described above, it was





The goal of the WinNTGen traffic generation project was to create a system capable of producing
realistic Windows NT-specific traffic that would complement the existing network traffic
producing capabilities of LARIAT. Specifically, the mechanisms used should allow for the
generation of any type of network traffic producible by Windows NT and be extensible enough so
that unforeseen sources of network traffic, such as new applications, services, etc., could be
added later and easily integrated into the system.
Since most network traffic is due to humans directly or indirectly controlling applications,
the WinNTGen system design includes a model of human-computer interaction (HCI). Some
parts of the original DARPA IDS Evaluation included user sessions for the Linux traffic
generators in which simulated users would telnet to a host, perform sets of actions such as using
ftp, etc, and then log out. Similarly, traffic produced in the WinNTGen system comes as a direct
result of the simulation of user actions rather than the emulation of lower level protocols.
However, the models of the users' sessions in the DARPA Evaluation came directly from
recorded network sessions, whereas the models in the WinNTGen system come from recorded
user interactions with various applications' GUIs on the host. For the evaluation of host-based IA
technologies, it is important that users are being modeled at this level since the series of events a
user performs may be used to detect illicit users or suspicious behavior. For the network-based
IA technologies, it makes little difference at which level the traffic generation occurs since it has
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no access to events occurring on the host. However, by controlling applications directly, the
network traffic timings and eccentricities of application implementations are accurately
reproduced. The application and operating system correctly formats, transmits, receives, and
interprets the network packets.
Table 1 summarizes the differences in traffic generation models between WinNTGen,
DARPA IDS Evaluations, and LARIAT.
DARPA IDS Eval LARIAT WinNTGen
(1999-2002) (2000 - Present) (2002)
Network Primarily UNIX with Primarily UNIX and Only Windows 2000 and
traffic some Windows NT some Windows NT above
produced
Traffic Simulated user sessions Simulated user sessions Simulated session of
generated by per individual per individual user interacting with
applications. Protocol applications. Protocol multiple applications
level interaction. level interaction. simultaneously




Per physical Thousands of users Thousands of users Single user
machine
capabilities
Network Fixed Variable Variable
Configuration
Table 1: Comparison of WinNTGen to LARIAT, DARPA IDS Eval
Originally, the system was to produce realistic multi-sourced multi-user network traffic.
To achieve this, each physical Windows host was to log on multiple simulated users
simultaneously and modify outgoing source specific host information in network packets.
However due to operating system constraints discussed in later sections, the original project goals
were altered. The modified project goal is to have one simulated user per physical host.
3.2 Generating the Network Traffic
In WinNTGen, a user simulator creates network traffic by interacting with multiple applications
such as using Outlook, telnet, ftp, or the Windows Explorer shell. All generation of user activity
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occurs at the session and application layers [23]. At a session level, the user simulator models a
user interacting with a set of applications simultaneously, interleaving different activities much
like a real user would. At the application level, the user simulator models the way in which a user
interacts with individual applications.
There are several advantages to this approach as compared to modeling lower level
application or protocol behavior. This level of abstraction increases the forward compatibility of
WinNTGen. The system is more resistant to problems created by upgrades in software because it
only needs to be concerned with interacting with the software at a higher level, rather than having
an understanding of the internal workings and protocols that produce network traffic. Also, by
controlling the application directly rather than implementing the protocols it uses, timing
characteristics, implementation eccentricities, and other identifying features of that particular
application appear in the network traffic automatically. For example, T. Lau and E. Horvitz used
a large set of distributions in modeling how web requests arrive at a server [24]. Given the
existence of embedded references in HTML documents such as images, part of their modeling
had to incorporate the behavior of the browser when retrieving these references. In WinNTGen,
by modeling the way in which the user interacts with the browser, all of the network traffic
characteristics resulting directly from the browser are already present. In Figure 3, WinNTGen
can be seen controlling several different applications which use an overlapping set of protocols.
The protocols in turn utilize the drivers which then use the hardware. Each of these layers can
affect the timing and content of data flowing out of the system. One action at the User Model
level can cause multiple packets being sent out on the network. For example, when a user
accesses a shortcut for the first time that points to a Windows network share there are multiple
network conversations that occur. First, the remote host name would need to be resolved via
DNS or WINS. Next, authorization would be carried out using LANMAN or Kerberos
authentication schemes. Finally the contents of the directory would be transferred via SMB over
22




Applications Web Browser Email Client Browser
Session Layer Protocols HTTP, POP, IMAP, DNS, SMTP
Transport Layer Protocols TCP, UDP, ICMP
Network Layer Protocols IPv4, IPv6
Hardware Layers Network Card
Figure 3: WinNTGen Layered Over Applications
The approach of modeling users in terms of user sessions is different from the rest of the
traffic producing mechanisms currently in use in LARIAT
The Linux based network traffic production systems in use in LARIAT currently produce
sets of Expect-based scripts [25] for each user session or service for the entire evaluation run.
Since all of the sessions are generated prior to the start of an experiment, the traffic generators are
not able to react to dynamic experiment conditions such as failures of network components. In
contrast, the Windows traffic generators are producing completely real-time sessions and are able
to react to changes in the testbed. For example, a simulated user might react to a downed telnet
server by choosing a different one to log-in to, rather than repeatedly trying to connect the broken
one.
In general, simulating user events is best done at the level at which users actually interact
with the system. In the case of UNIX based systems, a sequence of user events can be
represented by a character stream, the series of commands a user types. However, in the case of
Windows OSs, the sequence of user events is the set interactions with the GUI. As a result, a
different approach must be taken to model a user.
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3.3 User Modeling
Individual users are modeled as a collection of application use state machines (AUSMs). Each
AUSM encapsulates a user's behavioral pattern for a particular class of network traffic presence
such as browsing the web, sending email, etc., as depicted in Figure 4. Details of the individual
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Figure 4: Collection of AUSMs
Each state within a particular AUSM is a single action that the user can do such as
composing an email, sending an email, or navigating a web page as represented by A, B, C, D,
and E in Figure 4. Note that the granularity of a single user action is dependent upon the AUSM.
The collection of AUSMs will be referred to as the user simulator and is itself a state
machine consisting of a central transition state and all of the AUSMs in use. Note that many
states within an AUSM have edges that transition out of the AUSM. This simulates the way in
which real users interleave tasks when using a computer. For example, a user may be surfing the
web and then decide to email a link he ran across to a friend. Upon returning to surfing the web,
the user will start exactly where he left off. The transitions to the different states and different
AUSMs form a serial stream of user actions. There is currently no standard mechanism through
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which AUSMs can interact with one another. As a result, more complicated series of events are
not directly supported, such as a simulated user copying a URL from a browser window and then
pasting into an email to send to a friend. Although this behavior is possible to emulate, it has not
been explicitly built into the system in the interest of simplicity.
A more formal description of the user simulation process is as follows. At the beginning
of a simulation session, the user simulator selects an AUSM at random according to the AUSM-
use probabilities, denoted as P(Email) and P(Web Browsing) in Figure 4. Inside the chosen
AUSM, a start state is entered such as "Open a web browser." Then, transitions occur between
the different states depending on the edges. The edges have two values associated with them: P,
the normalized probability that this edge is taken out the current state versus another, and, D, the
set of parameters for some distribution that dictates the duration until this transition occurs.
Transitions between states inside the module are made by the algorithm appearing in Figure 5.
Transition(State CurrentState)
Begin








For(Edge = FirstEdge; Edge; Edge.GetNextEdge()
Total = Total + Edge.P;







Figure 5: State Transition Algorithm
25
From the current state, pick an edge at random out of the state according to the weights
and a time to wait until transition according to the distribution for that edge. Finally after waiting
that amount of time, make the transition. This process is repeated.
In order to vary the behavior of the AUSMs and, more generally, the simulated users, the
concept of a user class is introduced. Each class of user is defined by a different profile.
Examples of classes include secretaries and software developers. Each user class is defined in
terms of a profile. A profile for a particular user class is a collection of parameters that define
properties of the simulated user's behavior such as the frequency of email sent and file types of
attachments. For example, a user model of type secretary might have high transition probabilities
to the email AUSM, and the internal parameters for the email AUSM might include the email
addresses of the group for which he works and maybe even some typical emails that the secretary
would send.
This approach of completely defining the behavior for individual users is similar to that
of the work in the DARPA IDS Evaluation [4]. Although in that research, the user models were
monolithic. For example, the traffic generator would have the simulated user telnet into a server,
use finger and ping among other utilities, and then log out the user. The telnet traffic generator
had to be aware of the existence of the use of the other utilities.
The traffic generators in LARIAT are similar to the traffic generators from the DARPA
IDS evaluation in that a single user is chosen to log in via telnet to perform some action.
However in LARIAT, the simulated user performs actions that produce mainly one type of traffic.
This allows a more precise, higher level control of the distribution of protocols seen during an
experiment. For example, instead of logging into a server via telnet, using ftp, using ping, using
nslookup, and then logging out as in the DARPA IDS evaluations, the simulated user would log
in, use ftp for some period of time, and then log out.
The AUSMs currently in use in WinNTGen do not model user behavior in terms of goals,
operators, methods, and selection rules (GOMS)[26, 27]. In that research, a user is modeled by
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first selecting a set of goals that user wants to accomplish, and then deciding upon the series of
atomic actions the user should take in order to reach that goal. The AUSMs currently in use in
WinNTGen provide a set of actions the user can take at any point with no notion of a greater
intent. The knowledge that is embedded into the AUSM allows it to reproduce typical courses of
actions that the user takes, such as opening an email client, then checking email, sending email,
and finally closing email client, thereby creating a user plan[28]. If a greater level of
sophistication is desired in the user models in the future, it can be easily added by updating only
the AUSM and leaving the rest of the system intact.
In order to model user behavior on a larger time scale, such as over the course of a day or
work week, several mechanisms are employed. For controlling when a user from a particular
class logs in for the day, a mean daily start, mean daily finish, and distribution parameters for
both are used. This allows an experimenter to define when simulated users typically start using
network resources and when they stop. For example a group leader user class may have a mean
daily start of 8:30am with a low variance distribution indicating that he usually arrives the same
time every day whereas a developer may arrive uniformly between 9:00am and 12:00pm.
Also, during the course of the day user activity rates change. For example, during lunch
there is a noticeable drop in network activity. In order to model this, hourly rates are used. The
hourly rates simply scale the level of user activity by modifying inter-event and inter-AUSM
timings.
3.4 Obtaining Behavior Data
In order to obtain realistic timings for the simulated users, it was necessary to create a system for
recording real user's timings. A component object model (COM) plug-in [29] was created
capable of recording user events from Windows Explorer and Internet Explorer [30]. Events
were recorded from these applications in order to determine the user behavior for network file
share browsing and internet browsing, respectively. The plug-ins recorded user actions as a serial
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stream of events. Examples of an event stream can be seen in Figure 6. Note that in the figure,
events are numbered according to process ID in order to differentiate the parts of the stream
produced by different applications.
Open Browse Link on Open Open Wndows Browse Link on Browse Link on
internet Explorer - Page - Internet Explorer th Explorer fPage -Page
11 2 3 21
Noe atk thoe dFaiy l iBrowse Down One Close Inteoet Close Intedet Close Wand ows
coe akta _l rw th ork -y Level tExplorer - Explorer Expkoe
123 12 3
Figure 6: Event Stream
These events were then used to set the weights and transition times of the AUSM as discussed in
the next section. The actual event streams that were used to train the models discussed in this
paper came as a result of seven members of the Information Assurance group performing normal
daily internet and file browsing activities over the course of one week.
Note tri th Se daily log in and log off times were not recorded and modeled and were
chosen arbitrarily with the work day defined to be 8:30am to 5:00pm with an exponential
distribution that dictates the deviance from the mean for both. A more accurate model of login
and logoff times will be developed in the future.
3.5 Defining Application Use State Machine Behavior
There are two possible approaches that can be used to define A USM behavior. The first approach
is to train the AUSMs from the stream of recorded user events. This approach has the advantage
of realism, but requires real user data in order to set the transition parameters in the A USM. The
Windows Explorer and Internet Explorer AUSMs' parameters were set using this approach.
The other approach is to explicitly define the frequency of a certain states, such as Send
Email, and then use these frequencies to set the transition parameters in the model. The
advantage of this approach is that it allows an experimenter to set rates of certain actions and does
not require the AUSMs to be trained. The produced traffic will not be realistic in terms of user
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timings, but can be used to stress components of IA systems. The parameters in the Outlook
AUSM were set using this approach.
3.5.1. Training AUSMs from Event Streams
In order to define the behavior of an AUSM based on a stream of recorded events, each
recorded stream was fed through a program which set the parameters of state machines that
matched those found in the various AUSMs. As depicted in Figure 7, the program separated each
stream according to event source (i.e. the application that generated it) and process ID. Each of
these smaller streams was then fed through the appropriate internal state machine.
Event Type A Event Type I Event Type D Event Type 2
Time: 0 -> Time: 2 -y Time: 8 -y Time: 10 -
Single event PID: 1 PID: 0
stream recorded
from one user
Event Type C Event Type A Event Type C Event Type 4
10 Time: 20 -y Time: 25 -y Time: 28 -y Time: 33




Event Type A Event Type D Event Type C
Time: 0 Time: 8 Time: 20
PID: 0 PID: 0 PID: 0
Event Type 1 Event Type 2 Event Type 4
lime: 2 Time: 10 Time: 33
PID: 1 PID: 1 PID: I
Event Type A Event Type C
Time: 25 Time: 28
PID: 2 PID: 2
Figure 7: Event Stream Separation
Each of the internal state machines has a predefined start state, such as Open Internet
Explorer that it assumes will appear first in each stream. Once the start event appears in the
stream, the program traverses the state machine according to the events in the stream as depicted
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in Figure 8. The application keeps track of how often a particular edge was followed out of a
state as well as the time until that transition occurred. Once all the separated event streams had
been fed through their respective state machines, the transition probabilities and transition time
distributions were determined.
Note that it is not necessary to have a static model of the user's actions (i.e. one with a
fixed number of states). Only for simplicity were the static models used. Since the internal
behavior of the AUSMs is not predefined by WinNTGen, it is completely possible to use any type
of model of user behavior such as simply playing back recorded user events.
Evert A to D
Stat. A Total Traverses: 1
Times: {}




Figure 8: Traversing the State Machine
A transition probability was assigned to each edge leading out of a particular state by
normalizing the number of times each edge was taken out of that particular state. Only the
current state rather than the series of states leading up a transition was considered when
determining transition probabilities, or more formally, the probability model was first-order.
Empirical evidence from research conducted by L. Jung Jin and R. McCartney [31] suggests that
the two approaches produce similar probabilities when considering sequences of user actions.
In modeling the transition time for each edge in the various models, a single distribution
type was chosen rather than having a separate one for each edge. This was done due to the
current simplicity of the models and the lack of extensive user data. A more complicated
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distribution was deemed unnecessary since a cursory inspection of the collected user data
indicated that the distribution shapes were sufficiently similar.
This general distribution was derived from data collected from Internet Explorer usage
since the vast majority of recorded user data came from there. For each edge in the Internet
Explorer model, a CDF of the transition times was plotted in order to determine the features of
the distribution. An example of the general shape of the CDF of the collected data can be seen in
Figure 9. This particular plot is of the elapsed time between a user following a link on a web
page and then following a link on the new page.
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Figure 9: CDF of Transition Durations
An appropriate distribution would need to capture two features of cumulative distribution
of the recorded data. The first feature is the large number of data points around zero indicating
that a user performed an action then very quickly performed another action. The second feature
is the heavy tail that is present indicating that sometimes users perform actions and then do
nothing for long periods of time as previously noted by V. Paxon and S. Floyd [32].
The first feature can be captured by a general exponential distribution (Equation 1) since
it can be heavily weighted around zero. However, the exponential distribution does not have
heavy tails and therefore does not capture the second feature. The Pareto distribution (Equation 2)
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does have heavy tails, but it is not heavily weighted around zero. Therefore, in order to model the
observed data it was decided that a hybrid distribution would be used. The hybrid distribution
uses an exponential distribution to produce values close to zero and the Pareto distribution to
produce values for the tail as seen in Equation 3.
D(x) =1 -e~" Equation 1
D(x) =1 - Equation 2
x
1 -~ CA x:5 b
D(x)= - f x Equation 3
1- -x>b
The hybrid distribution has a breakpoint parameter, b, in addition to the parameters for
the Pareto and the exponential distributions. The breakpoint is the point at which the values
change from appearing to be exponentially distributed to being distributed according to a Pareto
and is derived from a ratio of the low mean values to the high mean values. To derive the
breakpoint, the values are bucketed according to the ratio, the top n% in one bucket and the
remaining 100-n% in the other bucket. The breakpoint is then chosen to be greater than the
maximum value of the lower bucket and lesser than the minimum value in the higher bucket.
The hybrid distribution fitted to the recorded data appearing in Figure 9 can be seen in
Figure 10. For this plot, the values used for X, a, 0, and b are 9, 1.1, 5, and 10 respectively. The
breakpoint in this case was based on inspecting and fitting this particular data.
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Figure 10: Fitted Hybrid CDF
In order to set the distribution parameters for the other edges, a general approach was
used so that each distribution in the future would not need to be explicitly fit by hand. After
examining the transition-time data for all edges, it was apparent that roughly 40% of the transition
times were produced by a heavy tailed process and 60% by a light tailed process. Therefore, the
breakpoint for each edge was set so that 40% of the data lie above the breakpoint and 60% of the
data lie below.
In order to derive the actual distribution parameters, the inverse CDF for the Pareto
(Equation 4) and general exponential (Equation 5) distributions were solved for their parameters
and evaluated at x, where x is equal to the breakpoint. For the Pareto distribution, a was set to be
1.1 since there was not enough high value data to justify deriving a different value for each
transition.
x x$= _ Equation 4
1.1
-x xA. = _ - Equation 5
In(0.4) 0.91
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3.5.2. Setting AUSM Parameters from State Frequencies
The other approach to define the behavior of the model is to explicitly set how often each state
should appear in the produced event stream. This allows a researcher, for example, to set roughly
how much POP traffic he would like to see in the generated network data in relation to SMTP
traffic while still maintaining the constraints present in the model such as the need for a user to
log in to a POP server before he can check his email.
Since there is more concern for rates than realistic state transitions, a simpler transition
model can be adopted. The motivation behind adopting a simpler model is to reduce the
complexity of the calculations inherent in working backwards from state frequencies to edge
probabilities and distribution parameters.
For this paper, the discrete time Markov model is used. In using a discrete time model,
the simplification is made that every edge takes a fixed amount of time thus leaving only the edge
probabilities to be determined.
The problem is as follows. Given r, r2 ,..., rk , the rate of occurrence of each of the states,
p , the probability of transitioning from state i to state j for all i and j, needs to be determined.
First the rates r, r2,..., r need to be converted into z, , )r2 , -,k , the probabilities that the current
state in a model will be 1, 2,...,k at some time in the future. To do this, each rate r needs to be
normalized by the total of all rates (Equation 6).
)ri = ,'Equation 6
This also guarantees the constraint present on Markov chains (Equation 7) is satisfied.
kI =1 Equation 7
Next, the balance equations (Equation 8) are set up in order to determine the probabilities.
)r, = k p Equation 8
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Now, values for p, can be chosen with the only other constraint being that all the probabilities
leaving a state must sum to one (Equation 9). Note there can be multiple solutions for a given set
of rates.
k
Vil5 i! k, X pLj =I Equation 9
j=1
Once the edge probabilities have been chosen, the edge transition time for every edge is set
(Equation 10). In order to clarify the equation with an example, if there is a total rate of ten
events per minute then transition the time for each edge should be six seconds.
At = rj ) Equation 10
3.6 Implemented Application Use State Machines
This section presents the Internet Explorer and Windows Explorer AUSMs, which were trained
by recorded user data, and Outlook model which was defined in terms of state frequencies.
3.6.1. Internet Explorer
The Internet Explorer AUSM models a user's interaction with the web browser as depicted in
Figure 11 with transition parameters appearing in Table 2. Note that the transition probabilities
also appear in the figure with the value of P(A-*B) appearing next to B. While this state machine
could be used for modeling a user interacting with any web browser, Internet Explorer was
chosen since it is predominantly used on the Windows OS.
The state machine attempts to capture the manner in which users browse the web by
defining an entrance and exit state (e.g. open and close the browser) and then a group of
completely connected intermediate states that define how a user browses web pages (e.g. follow a
link on the current page, browse to a favorite or book-marked link). This is a simple model and
does not capture more complicated behaviors such as how link appearance affects its probability
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of being chosen, which favorites a user chooses most often, or how a user refines web searches
[24], although this capability can be added if a more sophisticated model is needed.
Note that the Unknown state refers to the case when the source of the URL being
navigated to is unknown such as when a user types the URL directly into the address bar, clicks
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Figure 11: Internet Explorer AUSM
Open Browser Follow Link 0.26 4.40 1.1 7.69 7 4
36
Choose Favorite 0.01 6.29 1.1 10.99 10 2
Close Browser 0.40 6.92 1.1 12.09 11 63
50Unknown 0.32 1 4.40 1 1.1 7.69 1 7
Follow Link Follow Link 0.50 6.29 1.1 10.99 10 1037
Go Back 0.25 9.43 1.1 16.48 15 519
Choose Favorite 0.01 6.29 1.1 10.99 10 21
Unknown 0.20 6.29 1.1 10.99 10 415
Close Browser 0.05 9.43 1.1 16.48 15 104
Choose Favorite Follow Link 0.30 5.03 1.1 8.79 8 14
Go Back 0.08 4.40 1.1 7.69 7 4
Choose Favorite 0.14 9.43 1.1 16.48 15 7
Unknown 0.38 5.66 1.1 9.89 9 19
Close Browser 0.10 2.52 1.1 4.40 4 5
Go Back Follow Link 0.60 6.29 1.1 10.99 10 469
Go Back 0.12 3.14 1.1 5.49 5 94
Choose Favorite 0.001 6.29 1.1 10.99 10 1
Unknown 0.24 4.40 1.1 7.69 7 188
Close Browser 0.04 3.77 1.1 6.59 6 45
Unknown Follow Link 0.29 6.29 1.1 10.99 10 195
Go Back 0.11 3.14 1.1 5.49 5 74
Choose Favorite 0.01 4.40 1.1 7.69 7 7
Unknown 0.55 6.29 1.1 10.99 10 367
Close Browser 0.04 6.29 1.1 10.99 10 27
Close Browser Open Browser 1 1.89 1.1 3.30 3 17
Table 2: Internet Explorer AUSM Transition Parameters
3.6.2. Windows Explorer
The Windows Explorer AUSM attempts to capture the way in which users browse a network
share directory tree as depicted in Figure 12 with the transition parameters appearing in Table 3.
The entrance state is a user opening up an Explorer window for a network path such as
\\somemachine\someshare. The exit state is the user closing that particular browser window. The
intermediate states model how a user navigates a directory tree on a remote share.
Once again this is a simple model that only captures a user's directory browsing style. It
does not take into account which directories are browsed most frequently by users or other more
complicated behaviors.
Also, the file browsing AUSM does not currently attempt to open any files it finds while
traversing the directory tree. If this type of behavior is desired, another state could be added,
Open File, which would simply call ShellExecute(NULL, "open", Filename, CurrentDir,
SW.HIDE) where Filename is the file to be opened. This would let the shell choose the
application that is capable of opening files for the particular type. This would appear more
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realistic in terms of network traffic since the application would access the file across the network
in a realistic way. For example, if the file was a media stream, it would most likely be accessed
in a linear fashion.
This functionality was not implemented in the current version of this AUSM since every
call to ShellExecute resulted in another application being started and over the course of a long test
run this would slow the machine as more memory and CPU resources were utilized.
Compensating for this involves determining which applications were launched as a result of the
ShellExecute and then terminating them after some amount of time. Modeling arbitrary









Figure 12: Windows Explorer AUSM
Open Explorer Browse Down 0.56 3.77 1.1 6.59 6 22
Close Explorer 0.44 2.51 1.1 4.39 4 17
Browse Down Browse Down 0.27 3.14 1.1 5.49 5 19
Browse Up 0.21 2.51 1.1 4.40 4 15
Close Explorer 0.52 3.14 1.1 5.49 5 37
Browse Up Browse Down 0.45 1.89 1.1 3.30 3 30
Browse Up 0.21 1.89 1.1 3.30 3 14
Close Explorer 0.34 1.89 1.1 3.40 3 23
Close Explorer Open Explorer 1 2.51 1.1 4.40 4 52
Table 3: Windows Explorer Model Transition Parameters
There are several interesting points to note about the transition parameters. First, the
existence of more data points around zero (i.e. lower X parameters) as compared to the Internet
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Explorer data indicates that users browse directory trees faster than the internet since directory
trees have a more rigid hierarchical structure and users are generally file browsing for a specific
file. Second, the fact that roughly half of the time the user does no browsing at all after opening
an Explorer window would indicate that users have shortcuts to network shares they use most.
3.6.3. Outlook
The Outlook AUSM controls Microsoft Outlook. Currently the model, as depicted in Figure 13,
only encapsulates the behavior surrounding sending and receiving emails, but it would be










Figure 13: Outlook AUSM
Instead of defining the Outlook model edge parameters according to recorded user data,
they will be derived from the rates of occurrence using the approach described in Section 3.5.2.
First the balance equations for the AUSM are derived (Equation 11).
7C1 'r 4 P41
r2  A 2 2 P2 2 + 3 P 3 2  Equation 11
)T3 . 7trP 13 +)r 2 P 2 3 +)r 3P 33
)T4 = ,C2 P 24 + )r 3P 34
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Next, the state frequency rates for the experiment are set. Assume that the experimenter
would like to see the simulated user send emails at a rate of four times per minute and check
emails at a rate of twenty times per minute. The number of times the simulated user opens and
closes Outlook is of little importance to the experimenter and these will be set arbitrarily at three
times per minute each. The two rates must be equal since every time the simulated user enters the
state Close Outlook he must transition to the state Open Outlook. The steady state probabilities
for Open Outlook(nI), Check Email(n2), Send Email(n3 ), and Close Outlook(n4) are therefore 3/30,
20/30, 4/30, and 3/30 respectively. Substituting in the steady state probabilities and solving with
the aforementioned constraints yields the possible solution below (Equation 12).
p i -p =P12  3 ' P13  3
P32 10I'33 10 P34 10 Equation 12
P23 =4 9 P22 0 1 P24 =4
P41 =1
As explained before, the transition time is set to two seconds per edge since thirty transitions per





This chapter provides a detailed explanation of the implementation of the Windows Traffic
generator. Section 4.2 provides a summary of the attempted implementations and what prevented
those approaches from working, as well as reasoning behind the decisions leading to the current
implementation. Section 4.3 details the actual implementation of WinNTGen.
4.2 Abandoned Goal: Multiple Virtual Source Addresses
Initially, the goal was to implement a Windows NT network traffic generation system capable of
producing traffic from one host that would appear to be from multiple physical Windows NT
hosts. This is similar to the existing LARIAT Linux network traffic generators. A single host
traffic generation system capable of producing multi-sourced network traffic would be more
scalable than a system in which each host could only produce network traffic that appeared to be
from only that host. To achieve this, the project would have had two major parts. The first part
would be the actual user simulator capable of simulating the actions of multiple users. The
second part would be the mechanism through which source IP addresses and host information
would be changed so as to make the actual network traffic appear to be from multiple Windows
hosts.
Several solutions for single-host multi-sourced Windows network traffic were considered
and subsequently rejected for multiple reasons, including unacceptable losses of realism, low per-
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host throughput, and lack of forward compatibility. The problems arose strictly from
implementing the second major part of the system that changes the source host information.
4.2.1. User Space Filters
The first attempt at a solution was to use a Winsock 2 layered transport service provider[33]. The
service provider is implemented in a dynamic link library (DLL) and sits between the Winsock 2
API functions [34] and the base service providers (e.g. TCP/IP) in user space as depicted in
Figure 14. This solution involved using the existing network configuration mechanisms on
Windows to define multiple IP addresses on a host. Once the multiple IP addresses were defined,
the transport service provider could modify an application's calls to the bind and connect API
functions for a particular socket before they reached the base service provider. Upon intercepting
one of these calls, the socket would be bound to one of the locally defined IP address based on
process ID of the caller.







Wlnsock 2 Winsock 2
Transport API Namespace API
Transport Namespace
Service Providers Service Providers
Base Service Providers
Figure 14: Layered Service Provider
There are multiple advantages of this approach. It is forward compatible since it only
uses the Win32 API. It is lightweight since even though each process will load this DLL into
their virtual address space, only one copy need be present in physical memory. Finally, it is
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capable of catching all user mode socket operations since at some level they must use the sockets
API to make a connection.
The main disadvantage of this approach and the reason that it was abandoned is that none
of the network traffic originating in the kernel can be filtered, such as network file sharing or
active directory browsing. Drivers and services use the native Windows network stream
mechanism, the transport data interface (TDI), in order to send network packets. Winsock is in
fact a user mode wrapper that translates user space application calls into 10 control calls for a
kernel mode driver which makes the connection on the user space application's behalf. Section
4.2.2 gives a more in-depth explanation of network streams at the kernel level.
The other disadvantage to defining multiple IP addresses for a single Windows host is
that since Windows is aware that it has multiple IP addresses it will communicate this fact to
servers and other hosts when using certain protocols [35] such as WINS and NetBIOS, thus
defeating much of the desired realism in the Windows NT specific traffic.
When performing evaluations of networked based IA components, especially more
sophisticated ones, it is important that the network traffic produced by a single network traffic
generating host either appear to be only from that host or appear to be from completely different
hosts. Semi-realistic network traffic has the potential of producing many false alarms on the
networked based IA component since the network traffic will most likely be flagged as suspicious.
Even though this solution was abandoned as the main IP traffic generation approach, this
method of intercepting user space socket calls could still used by WinNTGen in the future in
cases where an experiment's goals warrant more volume in the form of non-Windows specific
traffic protocols such as HTTP and POP. This type of traffic can be multi-sourced easily using
the described method with few artifacts linking the different packets that are generated to a single
physical host.
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4.2.2. Kernel Space Filters
In order to catch all network traffic regardless of whether it originated from user space or kernel
space, a two layer system of filters was designed that would allow WinNTGen to modify all
network packets leaving and entering the system.
Host information in packets leaving the system would be modified based on the user
token of the process responsible for producing the traffic. This way, from a network standpoint,
all processes owned by a user would appear to be running on a separate physical host than
processes owned by a different user. Packets entering the system would need to be modified so
as to not be rejected as they pass back up the driver stack to the destined application or service.
The upper layer filter would be responsible for tagging any data originating from kernel
or user space bound for the network based on its original source. For example, this would include
network bound data directly originating from applications such as the result of a socket or send
call, or indirectly as in the case of an application calling CreateFileEx on a file residing on a
remote device. The upper layer filter is needed since it will be intercepting calls while the context
of these calls (i.e. the process making these calls) can still be determined. Once the data has
reached the network card, there is no way to determine which application produced it unless it is
tagged or exists in a table somewhere.
One part of the upper filter layer is a kernel driver that layers over TCPIP.sys as depicted
in Figure 15. This filter driver implements the transport driver interface (TDI) as TCPIP.sys
does and sits at the top of the driver stack thereby intercepting all calls originally bound for
TCPIP.sys. After modifying the appropriate data, the driver uses the TDI interface of TCPIP.sys
to pass on the calls. The difference between this driver and the Winsock service provider
mentioned before is that this upper layer driver will catch all of the socket style requests. It is
important to note that the upper layer filter would not need to modify incoming traffic since the
OS would properly hand the data to the right application or service.
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There would also need to be another part of the upper layer filter handles calls that
indirectly create network traffic such as CreateFileEx. This part was never built as the approach
was abandoned before this stage of implementation was reached.
The lower level filter consists of a single driver, a network driver interface specification
(NDIS) miniport, which is able to modify packets right before they are sent out on the network
(also depicted in Figure 15). It would need to modify the source IP address and any host specific
data present in the outgoing packets according to the tagging performed by the upper layer filter.
It would also need to monitor all packets on the network so as to listen for any packets bound for
any of the virtual hosts being emulated by the machine. Upon receiving an applicable packet, it
would need to modify the packet in such a way so that it would not be rejected as it is passed up


























Figure 15: Cooperating Kernel Mode Filters Design
Initially, using a pair of kernel drivers as described appeared to be ideal. However, such
was not the case since there is a large quantity of application layer data present in each packet that
reveals that the data is originating from a single host. This data can be extremely difficult to
change. For example, Kerberos traffic contains encrypted information about the hosts that are







part of the ticket is the client's identity along with its network address encrypted in the server's
private key. Changing the network address in this case is not feasible.
Other problems existed with solution as well. The development time for kernel drivers is
considerably longer than a user space program of equal size and complexity due to difficulties in
debugging and poorly documented events that occur in the kernel. Some of the system functions
that were to be used were undocumented and therefore might not be supported in future releases
of the operating system. For these reasons this approach was abandoned as a method for
modifying network packets.
4.3 Final Goal: Single Source Address
The final design of WinNTGen assumes one simulated user per physical host in which only user
mode applications are manipulated. This solution allows total realism and forward compatibility
since all simulation happens though the control of user-space applications. The disadvantage is
that the number of hosts scales with the number of simulated users, which is a large hardware cost.
However, this cost may be mitigated by using a package such as VMWare [37] on a machine of
sufficient resources.
4.3.1. Overview
WinNTGen consists of two parts as depicted in Figure 16. The first part is a substitute graphical
identification and identification (GINA) module, herein referred to WinGenGina. This part is
responsible for communicating with the LARIAT director and the database and for logging in
simulated users. The second part is an application, herein referred to as WinGenApp, which is
run automatically when the simulated user logs in. WinGenApp is responsible for interacting
with installed applications via AUSMs according to the simulated user's profile. When the time
comes for the user to log-out, WinGenApp terminates the user session and logs the user out, thus
returning control to the WinGenGina. A high level flow chart for the entire traffic generation
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process appears in Figure 17. In the figure solid lines represent program or application flow and
dotted lines represent network communication. Note that actions can occur outside of the normal
experiment flow. For example, any time the LARIAT director indicates that results should 
be
written to the database, WinGenGina will do so regardless of the current status of the experiment.
Windows Host
LARIAT System Context User Context
Director





Figure 16: WiNTGen High Level Structure
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Figure 17: WinNTGen Flow Chart
4.3.2. System Objects
There are several important objects in the WinNTGen system that appear as a part of both
WinGenGina and the WinGenApp and provide an abstraction for key, common functionalities.
Each of these objects resides locally on each WinNTGen traffic generator.
The first object is the Run Log. An instance of this object is passed to all other objects in
the system upon their creation so that they can make reports about the experiment and any
problems encountered. The Run Log object maintains a single log, common to all objects and
49
synchronizes access to it. At the end of the experiment, the Run Log object's contents are sent to
the LARIAT database.
The next object is the Parameter Database object. A copy of this object is passed to
almost all of the other objects in the system. Its role is to obtain configuration settings from the
local machine as well as store retrieved parameters from the LARIAT database on the network. It
maps disparate parameter sources into one namespace for convenience and abstraction. Given a
context and a variable name, the Parameter Database object will return the appropriate parameter.
Context refers to which category the parameter falls under. Typical categories include Host
Parameters, User Parameters, etc. By having such a database locally, AUSMs will not have to
be rewritten when the format of the data changes in either the LARIAT database on the network
or on the local host.
As mentioned before, AUSMs are used to drive the applications. In order to manage these
AUSMs as well as report statistics and information about them, a Module Manager object is used.
This object allows for easy enumeration and manipulation of the loaded AUSMs.
4.3.3. WinGenGina
As depicted in Figure 18, when the Windows host is booted, the OS loads the WinGenGina
replacement graphical identification and authentication DLL (GINA)'. Upon being loaded,
WinGenGina loads the original MSGina.dll and maps all the function entry points to its locally
defined function pointers. It also set up a listening TCP port in order to receive commands from
the LARIAT director2. Until the particular Windows host is contacted by the LARIAT director,
WinGenGina will behave like the original MSGina by transparently passing all calls from the
WinLogon process to MSGina.
This is done via modification of the registry value stored under HKEYLOCALMACHINE\
SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon
2 Currently, no authentication is being performed to verify the source of the connection. Deployable
versions will need to have authentication to prevent a potential security hole.
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From a GUI perspective, on the user logon screen alongside the normal logon dialog
there is another WinNTGen dialog box present that provides status information as well as letting
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Figure V 18: WiCniaCmoet
When an experiment begins, the LARIAT director contacts each Windows host to
communicate the IP address of the LARIAT database to use. The WinGenGina then fetches the
parameters from the specified database on the network, including the user profile, host specific
parameters, and specific parameters requested by the AUSMs loaded by the Module Manager. It
then stores them in the Parameter Database object. After this is done, WinGenGina replies that it
is ready. When all of the hosts in the testbed are ready for the experiment, the director informs
them that the experiment is starting. WinGenGina then waits to the appropriate log in time of the
simulated user as dictated by the user profile. When the appropriate time arrives, WinGenGina
disables the interactive login and sends a custom secure attention sequence (SAS) to log in the
simulated user. Before the user is actually logged in, the Parameter Database is serialized into a
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shared memory segment so that it can be read by the WinGenApp. Upon the simulated user
being logged-in, the WinGenApp is launched', which then assumes control of the user simulation
and traffic generation.
4.3.4. WinGenApp
The WinGenApp is responsible for driving applications according to the simulated user's profile.
As with the WinGenGina, a copy of the application must be installed on every Windows NT
machine taking part in the experiment. As mentioned previously, it creates network traffic by
controlling applications that utilize the network. It can be extended through AUSMs that allow it















Figure 19: WinGenApp Module Diagram
3 This is done by placing the WinGenApp in the startup folder of the simulated user.
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A complete course of execution for WinGenApp during an experiment is as follows.
After the simulated user is logged-in by the WinGenGina, the WinGenApp is launched.
WinGenApp creates an instance of the Parameter Database by reading the from the shared
memory segment created by the WinGenGina. It then creates an instance of the module manager
which loads the available AUSMs on the system and prepares them for use. The complete
process of AUSM selection and event generation was detailed in Section 3.3. When it is time to
logoff, WinGenApp simply ends the current user session and logs off.
The stream of generated user events is recorded by WinGenApp since the AUSMs return
an opaque description of each event executed. This stream may be replayed by handing back the
events one at a time to the appropriate AUSM for execution. Note that during playback the
individual AUSMs will not be able to make alternate transitions based on error conditions or
configuration changes since the stream is predetermined. However, playback is useful when
there is a phenomenon in the experiment that the experimenter would like to try to reproduce.
4.3.5. AUSM Implementation
AUSMs are implemented as dynamic link libraries (DLLs). Each DLL exports a set of functions
that enables it to be used by WinGenApp as described in Table 4. Note that the return type of
each function is void since errors are reported using structured exception handling.
GetModuleInfo Return information about the AUSM including a description and the types of
parameters it will need from the database
Initialize Verify that relevant applications are present, initialize data structures, retrieve
parameters from the local parameter database, and perform all general start
up operations
Generate Generate a series of events according to the internal model of the module
Update Reread relevant parameters from the local parameter database object
Reset Module should reset to the start state and prepare to be run again
Exe cut e Take the passed in event and execute it
Des cEvent Return a textual description of the passed in event
DeleteEvent Free memory used by this event
Table 4: Exported DLL Functions
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The DLLs may link into WinNTGen libraries to have access to convenient classes such as a value





In order to evaluate various performance characteristics of the WinNTGen system, a
network was set up as depicted in Figure 20. In order to isolate the traffic produced by
WinNTGen and thereby produce a more meaningful evaluation some elements of a typical
LARIAT testbed, such as the Linux network traffic generators, are not present.
The test network, testbed.edu, consists of four hosts connected by a hub. The first host,
Director.testbed.edu, is a LARIAT director and database in order to provide the necessary
framework for the evaluation. The second host, GenXP.testbed.edu, is running WinNTGen on
Windows XP (NT 5.1) Pentium III with 640 MB of RAM. The third host, Server.testbed.edu, is
the domain controller for the testbed.edu domain and is configured with a local DNS, Active
Directory, Exchange Server, and several network shares. The fourth host is a sniffer and was
responsible for recording all network traffic for the testbed.edu network that was used in the
analyses. An external router/DNS forwarder was used so that the Internet Explorer AUSM could
browse real web pages thereby permitting a better evaluation.
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Figure 20: Evaluation Testbed
Two different analyses were performed in order to evaluate the WinNTGen system. The
first analysis verifies that the contents of the packets produced by WinNTGen are reasonably
realistic. The second analysis examines system throughput.
5.2 Realism
The realism of the WinNTGen system was evaluated by comparing network traffic produced by
the stream of artificially generated events to the network traffic produced by a real user executing
the same series of events.
Specifically, the sniffer recorded network traffic as WinNTGen executed a login
sequence for a simulated user, then produced different series of user events via the different
AUSMs for a four hour period, and finally logged out the simulated user. Subsections of this
traffic were compared to network traffic recordings resulting from the same sequences of user
events executed by a human user. The results appear in the following sections.
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5.2.1. Login and Logout traffic
There should be no difference in network traffic resulting from WinNTGen simulated user logins
and real user logins due to the way in which WinNTGen implements this functionality. When
logging in a simulated user, WinGenGina enters the username and password of the simulated user
directly into the login dialog box via the FindWindowEx and SetText functions. WinLogon
is not able to differentiate between this programmatically controlled login and a real login and
therefore the resulting network traffic should appear to be the same as compared to a login
initiated by a real user.
A side-by-side comparison of packets recorded from the WinNTGen login and the real
user login, Figure 21, reveals that the two are indeed effectively the same. In the figure there are
three packet sequences. The top one is from the LARIAT Director communicating with
WinGenGina. The middle one shows a case in which a WinNTGen logon produced the same
traffic as a real user logon. Finally, the last sequence shows a case in which there are several
overlapping conversations. The differences between the two sides in the last sequence results
from the packets from different startup operations, such as downloading the user's profile,
downloading the policy settings, and calls to the MS NT Directory DRS Endpoint, being
interspersed differently. The WinNTGen and real user logout sequences exhibit this type of
variability as well.
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Traffic Produced by WnNTGen Traffi
Souce Deoiliulon Src Prt Dot Prt Size Proocol SoGuM
D*rwctor tsstbed.edu genxp.testd.edu 7021 12001 66 LARIAT
Director.tsstbed.edu genxp.tested.edu 7021 12001 64 LARIAT
D Orectortestbed.edu genxp.tes9bd.edt 7021 12001 111 LARIAT
Dctor.testbed.edu genmp.testbed.edu 7021 12001 68 LARIAT
Director.testbed.edu genxp.testbed.edu 7021 12001 66 LARIAT
gunxp testhed eti sener.testbed.edu 1101 66 346 IEP Kerbe ul msp testbed edu
sanertestbed .4d genxp.testbed.edu 68 1101 1402 WP Kubrel Isnrtsbed edu
genxp.testbed.edu senertestbed.edu 1102 88 1360 L.EP Krbwwp testbededu
senr.tlestbed.d gmp.tetbed .edu 88 1102 1362 DP Kbwrt estb.edu
genxp.testbed.ec serwlestbed edu 1103 4488 66 SMeL .enp testbed.edu
senr.tstbed.edu genxp.tested du 446 1103 66 SJDP .6mw testbed.edu
genxp.testbed.ed6 saerw.tstbed.edu 1103 445 64 SME1B .estbed.edu
gexp.testbed.ed6 senertestbed.edu 113 44 166 SMB l .-testbededsu
senw.testbed.edu gensp.testbed.edu 446 1103 23 6 MB er.tested.edu
genxp.testbed.e46 sew.testbed.edu 1103 445 1518 SMB .testbeduedu
genxptestbed mdt smnwr.testbed.edu 1116 66 1361 LDP Kurbecs .. p.testbed.edut
sertestbededtu genxp.tested.edu 445 1103 160 SMB sener.testbed.edu
genxp.testbed.e6 sw.testbed.edu 1103 445 20 SM gnxp testied.edu
senrutestbed.edu genxp.testbed.edu 68 1118 1364 LIP K---- & poestbed.edu
seer.eetbed.edu genxp.testbed.edu 445 1103 166 SM IIII
gexp testbed.et sener.testbed.edu 1103 446 286 SM f j.testbed.edu
sertestbed.edu gemp.tested.edu 445 1103 186 SMB testededt
genxp.testbed.et snw.testbed.edu 1103 445 200 0MB .testededu
serwrtestbed.edu genxp.tested.edu 446 1103 166 SMB .testbed.edu
geixp testbed.ed smw.testbed.edu 1114 446 1818 SMS ffertestbededu
gep.testbed.e4 smw.testbed.edu 1114 446 125 6MB .tested.eduensertestbed.edu
c Produced by Real User




















































































Figure 21: Comparison of Logon Network Traffic
5.2.2. AUSM Generated Traffic
It was hypothesized that there would be slight differences between the WinNTGen and the user
generated network traffic for the same sequence of user actions because of the granularity at
which the existing AUSMs choose to operate. For example, when composing an email, the
Outlook AUSM currently does not model the times between resolving a recipient's email address
with the Exchange server, composing a message, and finally sending the email. Rather, when
arriving at the Send Email state, it performs these actions in under a second and does not produce
any traffic that results from interacting with the U1 at a key stroke by key stroke basis such as
auto-completion of the recipient's name as it is being typed. A real user performs the actions
sequentially with delays between them.
Given that these types of differences exist and come directly as a result of model
granularity, a more useful analysis is to expose any errors directly resulting from choosing to
control applications through automation. Note that it is not meaningful to compare the user
58
events generated by WinNTGen to that of a real user since the user models in use are not
predictive[38], nor is it meaningful to test for self similarity[39] in the traffic [32, 40] since the
timing in the AUSMs are generated by a heavy tailed process and therefore self similar by
definition.
In order to generate network traffic for analysis, WinNTGen was run for a four hour
period with the Internet Explorer, Windows Explorer, and Outlook AUSMs loaded. The resulting
network traffic was recorded and then filtered so that only traffic produced directly as a result of
WinNTGen was retained. From this recorded traffic, three random segments were chosen that
each contained traffic produced mostly by one AUSM. Any traffic not produced by the AUSM in
interest was filtered out. The chosen segments appear in Figure 22, Figure 23, and Figure 24.
Internet Explorer AUSM
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Figure 22: Internet Explorer AUSM (AUSM Generated Events and Packets Produced)
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Outlook AUSM











Figure 23: Outlook AUSM (AUSM Generated Events and Packets Produced)
Windows Explorer AUSM









Figure 24: Windows Explorer AUSM (AUSM Generated Events and Packets Produced)
There are several aspects of the traffic that are worth noting. In Figure 22, as expected,
whenever a user event occurs, such as navigating to a hyperlink in a document, the browser
produces large bursts of packets as the new page and all its embedded references (e.g. images) are
retrieved. In Figure 23, the packets that are being produced without user action are from Outlook
periodically checking the simulated user's inbox. Also in this figure is a large spike of packets
around the 3:15 mark that result from the simulation user deciding to download the actual
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messages. Finally, in Figure 24, the correlation between user browsing events and packets
produced can be seen.
It is apparent that some user actions produce no traffic. For example, in the case of
Internet Explorer, cached web pages are usually not downloaded again when the user browses
back to them. Also, the action of closing Windows Explorer produces no traffic. These events
should still be included, however, since they affect the OS state, and it is possible that in the
future these events will produce packets on the network.
5.3 Throughput
Even though the goal of the WinNTGen system is to produce realistic network traffic, it is also
necessary in some experiments to be able to produce large amounts of traffic of a certain type in
order to stress test network services or, more generally, in cases where realism is not the primary
goal.
To test the throughput of WinNTGen on a single machine, the delays between simulated
user events were removed and the AUSMs were tested independently for increasing numbers of
running instances of WinNTGen. In these tests, the actual data rate was not considered since it is
based completely on content such as the size of the emails, and does not meaningfully measure
the performance of WinNTGen. Rather, the tests measured the packet producing ability of each
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Figure 25: AUSM Scalability
For the Outlook AUSM there is a constant traffic rate regardless of the number of
instances of WinNTGen. This can be explained by the fact that each Outlook AUSM instance is
controlling the same instance of Outlook. Since a single AUSM instance is able to completely
utilize Outlook, adding additional instances does not increase the rate at which Outlook can
perform tasks.
For the Internet Explorer AUSM there are initial increasing returns in packet rates to the
number of instances of the AUSM since each AUSM controls a different instance of Internet
Explorer. However, as more instances are added they begin to compete with one another for local
resources and the local machine begins to thrash.
Finally, for the Windows Explorer AUSM, an increase in packet rate was observed as the
number of instances of the AUSM was increased. However, eventually there is are decreasing
returns to adding more instances of WinNTGen as the separate instances begin to compete for
local system resources as the Internet Explorer AUSMs did.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
6.1 Conclusions
It is clear that network based IA systems need to be thoroughly evaluated before they are
deployed so that their true performance may be ascertained. To do this, they must be examined in
controlled, evaluation network environments that are representative of actual production network
environments. Due to the ubiquity of hosts running Windows OSs, it is necessary to include
network traffic generated by Windows hosts in these evaluations. WinNTGen was shown to be a
tool capable of producing such realistic network traffic, as well as being able to integrate into the
existing LARIAT framework.
Through modeling user behavior at an application and session layer, WinNTGen is
capable of producing complex, realistic network traffic though simple models of application use.
By controlling applications via AUSMs, WinNTGen is modular and easily extensible.
In implementing WinNTGen, it became evident that modifying and hooking into the
Windows NT OS at the kernel level in order to create multiple virtual hosts on one physical host
is time consuming and difficult and still does not result in the production of realistic network
traffic. Clearly, a better approach was to assume one user per physical host, to perform user
modeling instead of application and protocol modeling, and to allow the Windows NT OS to
perform much of the network traffic generation through its normal activity.
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6.2 Future Work
There are several ways in which WinNTGen can be further developed. In order to add variety to
the generated traffic, more AUSMs can be added to the system in order to increase the number of
applications that could be controlled.
Also, the AUSMs can be made more complex in order to produce chains of events that
more closely resemble those produced by a human. There are many improvements that can be
made in this area, but there are a couple of key ones.
First, by adding daily goals for the user to achieve, sequences of user events would
appear to have a purpose. That way, when the simulated user went web surfing, he would tend to
follow links more related to what he needs and would send emails that are more relevant to the
daily goal. For a network based IA system looking for suspicious browsing behavior, this might
be important. These systems may flag suspicious activities such as a user performing web
searches for the word "sploits" and browsing to sites known to host malicious code.
Second, by adding requires and provides concepts to the modules, a control interface
could be used for classes of applications. For example, web browsers and email clients could be
controlled without dependence on the actual client. This way, for example, a simulated user
could be browsing and choose to forward a URL to a friend with the user's favorite email client.
WinNTGen already provides limited modeling of user interaction with a Windows user
interface and the network traffic it produces is realistic. Its architecture and implementation will
support these and other additions.
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